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AN ACT OF FAITH 
Jerry J. Phillips* 
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW. By Richard A. Epstein. 
Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books. 1980. Pp. 210. $25. 
Recently our minister was telling us about theology school. "We 
were taught very early in our careers," he said, ''that the single most 
important thing about a man is what he believes - his faith." When 
I first heard this central tenet of the theologian, I thought how very 
different it was from the legal world, where we are impressed by em-
pirical data and practical considerations. A leap of faith is not 
grounded in reason, and thus seems to have little place in the world 
of law. 
The more I have thought about the comparison of law and theol-
ogy, however, the more I have come to believe that they are not so 
different after all. Throughout the law, we make many assumptions 
about human nature that are not empirically demonstrable. We ad-
mit dying declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule, for exam-
ple, because we assume that persons are generally uninclined to die 
with a lie on their lips, but we have no way to establish the validity 
of that assumption. We assume that free speech promotes free de-
bate and a more enlightened and democratic society, but we cannot 
establish the validity of that assumption either. It is based on 
intuition. 
Much of tort law, including products liability law, is based on the 
yet untested assumption that tort liability provides an incentive to 
care. Justice Mosk, in his dissent in Daly v. General Motors Corp., 1 
resists the adoption of comparative fault in strict product liability 
cases because, he contends, such a rule would decrease the manufac-
turer's incentive to produce a safe product. Richard Epstein faults 
Justice Mask for making this argument: 
As is so often the case with incentive arguments, the results are incon-
clusive without empirical evidence, and the empirical evidence that is 
required is, only because of the difficulty of the subject matter, never 
forthcoming. [P. 132.] 
* W. P. Toms Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A. 1956, Yale University; 
B.A., M.A. 1958, Cambridge University; J.D. 1961, Yale University. - Ed. 
1. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978). 
973 
974 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 80:973 
Similarly, Professor Epstein criticizes Justice Traynor's reliance on 
incentive policy-analysis as the basis for adopting strict tort liability 
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc .:2 
If ninety-nine cases out of a hundred will be decided the same way no 
matter what liability rule is adopted, then the shift in rules simply can-
not make that great a difference in the behavior of the parties whose 
conduct is governed by them. [P. 40.] 
Later, in discussing Learned Hand's famous cost-balancing test,3 he 
says: 
The central assumption of Hand's position, as applied to design de-
fect cases, is that in the absence of judicial intervention firms will have 
incentives not to do their best on matters of safety . . . . The "lags" in 
safety can be shown only if, holding technology constant, there is some 
residual improvement in safety levels during the last decade or so at-
tributable to judicial innovation. The position has by no means been 
established, and it is in large measure doubtful. [P. 89.] 
When criticizing the work of others, Professor Epstein seems well 
aware of the dangers of drawing unwarranted inferences from inade-
quate ( or even nonexistent) empirical research. 
But Epstein is hoist by his own petard. His criticism ofTraynor's 
position in Greenman impliedly assumes that "ninety-nine cases out 
of a hundred will be decided the same way" no matter whether neg-
ligence or strict liability rules are applied. Yet he offers no proof of 
that assertion. On the same page where he criticizes Hand's negli-
gence-incentive argument, he asserts: "Each firm when acting in its 
own self-interest will improve safety levels even in the absence of 
exposure to product liability suits" (p. 89). What proof does he 
have? He simply asserts that if manufacturers do not continually 
strive for safer products, then "losses in production" and "expensive 
repairs" caused by unsafe products will "reflect ill on the reputation" 
of the "[c]omplacent firms [that] run the risk of displacement and 
bankruptcy at the hands of competitors who provide better and safer 
products to their customers" (p. 89). For those who share Epstein's 
economic faith, this proposition will be intuitively obvious. 
Others will have doubts. Terence Ison, in particular, offers a 
more pessimistic view. In reviewing the New Zealand no-fault sys-
tem, Ison says: 
The dogma that safety and profit inevitably coincide is widely pro-
claimed and accepted not because of any validity but because of the 
comfort that it can offer to all concerned. For companies and other 
employers, it denies any need for government regulation, and it denies 
2. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (en bane). 
3. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932). 
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any need for health and safety to become a controversial issue in la-
bour relations. For government officials, it justifies a non-controversial 
role of exhortation and tends to minimise any perceived need for the 
more hostile and controversial role of enforcement. For company doc-
tors, it can help to promote an image of neutral and professional help 
to labour and management, and to deny that their role involves partici-
pation in controversial issues of labour relations. For union officials, 
acquiescence in the dogma can justify the avoidance of confrontations 
with management on issues that can be highly technical, where success 
may be hard to demonstrate and where membership support may be 
uncertain. For workers, the dogma facilitates a natural human wish to 
believe that life is not threatened by the ways in which they must earn 
a living. 
The dogma is counter-productive in several ways. By denying the 
existence of any conflict of interests, it implicitly denies the need for 
any procedures to resolve the conflicts. It undermines the need for set-
ting health and safety standards, and it undermines the democratic 
process by denying any need for worker participation or public partici-
pation in the setting of those standards. 
Perhaps the most objectionable features of the dogma are its denial 
of truth, and the ultimate conclusion to which it tends to lead, i.e., that 
killing and maiming are acceptable as long as they are profitable.4 
However one characterizes the connection between profit and safety 
- whether one sides with Epstein or Ison - few will contend that 
bald, unsupported assertions about the issue contribute anything to 
the debate. 
Professor Epstein's position is, moreover, internally inconsistent. 
In arguing for contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability, 
he contends that the defense does indeed encourage care. He does 
not explain why imposing greater costs on litigants - increasing de-
fendants' liabilities with strict liability, diminishing plaintiffs' recov-
eries with contributory negligence - would tend to make plaintiffs 
more careful, but would not do the same for defendants. To the ar-
gument that no additional incentive is needed to induce people to 
care for their own safety or property, he points to the fifty-five miles-
per-hour national speed limit, which has reduced road accidents sig-
nificantly. Although he acknowledges that other factors may be at 
play, he nevertheless concludes: "[I]t seems clear that the speed 
limit, especially when enforced, is a dominant factor'' in reducing 
accidents (p. 130 n.22). I suppose that if ''when enforced" means 
that anyone who exceeds the speed limit will be stopped, then the 
proposition is self-evident. (My teenage son, however, tells me that 
many people exceed the speed limit.) In any event, even if the lower 
4. T. ISON, ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 165 (1980) (criticizing the New Zealand law). 
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speed limit has reduced accidents, it does not necessarily follow that 
the defense of contributory negligence will increase self-care. 
I think that it is fair to conclude that Professor Epstein has faith 
in manufacturers' voluntary concern for the safety of consumers, but 
has little faith in the voluntary concern of consumers for their own 
safety. I do not share these beliefs. Justice Stewart once said about 
hard-core pornography, "[p]erhaps I could never succeed in intelligi-
bly [defining it]. But I know it when I see it."5 By analogy, I cannot 
demonstrate the inaccuracy of Professor Epstein's catechism, but my 
common sense tells me that it is not quite right. I believe that both 
manufacturer and consumer are responsive to safety incentives, but 
that the manufacturer, with all its expertise, is in a much better posi-
tion than the average consumer to decrease the incidence of 
accidents. 
Professor Epstein would also revitalize the defense of assumption 
of the risk, even for workplace injuries. He concludes, for example, 
that the facts inMical!efv. Miehle Co.6 ''warranted a directed verdict 
for the defendant manufacturer'' (p. 145). The defect there - a 
printing press without an easily accessible emergency shut-off button 
- was open and obvious, and if the employee ''was unsatisfied with 
the conditions of labor, he might have chosen to work elsewhere" (p. 
145). One is reminded of Marie Antoinette's response when told that 
the peasants lacked bread: "Qu'ils mangent de la brioche." 
There are some positions that a society should insist upon even if 
they do not comport with what empirical evidence indicates would 
otherwise be ordinary conduct. Professor Epstein tells us that it is 
"probable that most purchasers would in fact accept limitations 
upon liability as being in their own self-interest" (p. 55). Initially, I 
find this to be a startling observation about human nature - al-
though neither of us can prove or disprove the observation empiri-
cally. But even ifhe is correct, it does not follow that the law should 
condone such agreements when they are not in the best interests of 
society. I suppose, for instance, that many employers would use 
child labor if permitted to do so, and that many children would ac-
cept such employment. This is not a persuasive argument for re-
turning to nineteenth-century working conditions. 
I am pleased that Professor Epstein recognizes at least that "to-
day it is tilting at windmills to fight the anti-contractual bias" of 
products liability law (p. 55). I would not, however, characterize one 
5. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
6. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976). The case involved a photo-
offset press operator who got his hand mangled in the printing machinery. 
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who so tilts as a modem-day Don Quixote. Perhaps, a modem-day 
troglodyte would be a better comparison. 
One of Professor Epstein's major concerns is with design litiga-
tion. He believes -with Professor Henderson, to whom Epstein ac-
knowledges that he "owes much" (p. 69) - that the jury is not 
equipped to decide cases involving conscious design decisions of the 
manufacturer. They should be restricted to " 'strong' design defect 
cases" - those resting on the defendant's "express or implicit repre-
sentations" about his product - and to those cases involving "the 
defendant's breach of external standards, whether imposed by stat-
ute or by common practice." The " 'modem' design defect cases," 
involving "extended use of cost-benefit formulas," he believes are 
.not capable of rational jury determination (p. 69). The gist of his 
argument seems to be that fact-finders should be allowed to hear 
only easy cases, and that the hard decisions should be left to the 
manufacturer's untrammeled discretion. If one has little faith in the 
judicial system, this position is eminently correct. I prefer, however, 
not to make the manufacturer the ultimate arbiter of its own con-
duct. There is no other readily apparent arbiter than the judicial 
system, which works somewhat like the democratic form of govern-
ment: It has many faults, but no one has yet come up with a better 
system. 
Professor Epstein covers all aspects of products liability law, and 
I think it is fair to say that in practically every instance he argues for 
a decidedly conservative position that favors the manufacturer. His 
consistent stance is understandable in view of the fact that the book 
"began as a more modest research endeavor undertaken in 1976 at 
the request of the Amercan Insurance Association.''7 
The book is generally well-written and often insightful. Profes-
sor Epstein writes with a fl.air, and turns many quotable lines. If it 
were not for matters of fundamental principle, I would be persuaded 
by many of his arguments. 
7. P. vii (Foreword by T. Lawrence Jones, President of the American Insurance 
Association). 
